If the purpose of the BRICS group — originally Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — is to amplify its members’ global influence, it may be having some effect. Looming geopolitical divisions are forcing countries to declare who their friends are, and the BRICS membership is growing.
At a more practical level, the group is still far short of a genuine political or economic bloc. The close of the latest BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, this week marks 15 years of regular meetings — which have accomplished almost nothing.
The group’s New Development Bank disbursed only $1.2bn of financing in 2022. A Contingent Reserve Arrangement to provide lending between members has achieved little.
With the addition of new members earlier this year — Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — the collective membership looks more ill assorted than ever.
“Let’s not waste time talking about whether it’s a geopolitical bloc — if anything, the BRICS expansion makes it clear that it isn’t,” said Monica de Bolle, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “On almost everything, the BRICS countries are not on the same page.”
What has changed, said de Bolle, is the political backdrop. Tension between China and Russia on one hand and the US and Europe on the other is ramping up.
Iran is increasing its military trade with both China and Russia. The US confirmed in September that Iran had delivered close range ballistic missiles to Russia. On Monday, the US added six Chinese companies to its export blacklist for helping Iran develop weapons of mass destruction.
From this perspective, a core of BRICS members do share a common interest, said Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Centre for a New American Security thinktank. “They want an alternative payment mechanism because they want less sensitivity to US sanctions,” he said. “The Chinese are increasingly trying to have energy shipments come overland, not seaborne where they are vulnerable. These countries are defending themselves against what they see as Western domination, and they’re determined to do something.”
In this context, joining the BRICS denotes being friendly with China and Russia.
It is a step too far for some countries. Argentina has decided against joining, as has Saudi Arabia. Other states have opted to become ‘partner countries’.
On Wednesday, the group announced 13 new partners including Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. But that does not mean they have joined China’s camp.
At an IIF panel on geopolitics, Michèle Flournoy, co-founder of WestExec Advisors and a former US under-secretary of defence, referred to these countries as “swing states”. In Asia, nations like Vietnam and Malaysia have China as their primary trading partner and the US as their main security guarantor. “These countries wake up every day and hope they don’t have to choose,” said Flournoy.
For these countries — several of which are wary of Chinese military power — BRICS membership is about signalling non-alignment.
“Where the BRICS have become more relevant is that the world is splitting into US-centric and China-centric,” says de Bolle. “Many of the countries in the global south are simply not interested in taking part in this [divide].”
But rising tensions between certain BRICS members and the West makes membership deeply problematic for genuinely non-aligned states like Brazil. “[President] Lula has been having an extremely difficult time in navigating membership,” said de Bolle.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is keen to strengthen Brazil’s relationships but — like many other leaders — he has no desire to be labelled China-dependent. The greater the threat of conflict, however, the harder this line will be for countries in the global south to walk.